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Section 51AA before the High Court 
 
 
The High Court has recently considered the operation of s51AA of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘s51AA’).  Section 51AA(1) provides: 
 
“A corporation must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is 
unconscionable within the meaning of the unwritten law, from time to time, of 
the States and Territories.” 
 
The issue for determination by the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ) in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
v C G Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 197 ALR 153 was whether certain 
conduct by a commercial landlord infringed the statutory provision. 
 
The central facts are relatively well known and may be stated succinctly.  A 
tenant of premises in a shopping centre (Mr and Mrs Roberts) wished to sell a 
business conducted from the leased premises.  The tenant’s decision to sell 
was motivated by a desire to care for their daughter who suffered from a 
serious and distressing illness.  Unfortunately, the tenant had no option to 
renew their lease.  The only way the tenant could offer a purchaser of their 
business a worthwhile tenure was if the landlord agreed to an extension or 
renewal of the lease and an assignment.  The landlord was prepared to co-
operate but only on the basis that the tenant withdrew legal proceedings 
pending against the landlord (for alleged over-recovery of charges levied 
under the lease).  Faced with this difficult bargaining position, the tenant 
considered that they had no choice but to accede to the landlord’s 
requirements.  In accepting the landlord’s stipulation, the tenant disregarded 
legal advice to the contrary. 
 
The litigation was pleaded and conducted on the footing that the statutory 
expression ‘engage in conduct that is unconscionable within the meaning of 
the unwritten law, from time to time, of the States and Territories’ was to be 
understood with reference to the equitable doctrine expounded in Commercial 
Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, namely where 
unconscientious advantage has been taken by one party of the disabling 
condition or circumstance of the other.  On this basis, the issue for 
determination was whether the insistence by the landlord upon the 
discontinuation of the litigation by the tenant, as a condition of the grant of a 
fresh lease, constituted the unconscientious exploitation of a special 
disadvantage suffered by the tenant. 
 
At first instance, Justice French held the landlord’s conduct to be 
unconscionable (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v C G 
Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2000) ATPR ¶41-778).  In reaching this conclusion, 
Justice French opined that the tenant suffered from a ‘situational’, as distinct 
from a ‘constitutional’, disadvantage evidenced by their urgent need to renew 
the lease to enable them to proceed with the sale and thereby maintain the 
value of their business.  This situational disadvantage was reflected in a gross 
inequality of bargaining power between the parties.  In the view of Justice 
French, the landlord used its superior bargaining power to extract a 
concession from the tenant that was commercially irrelevant to the terms and 
conditions of the new lease.  The Full Court of the Federal Court (Hill, 
Tamberlin and Emmett JJ) reversed the decision of French J (C G Berbatis 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2001) 
185 ALR 555).  The Full Court considered that the landlord had merely 
adopted an opportunistic approach and struck a hard commercial bargain 
rather than having acted unconscionably within the meaning of the statute. 
 
The High Court, in a 4 to 1 ruling (Kirby J dissenting), dismissed the appeal of 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (‘the ACCC’).  The 
separate judgments will be considered briefly. 
 
Gleeson CJ 
 
In the view of Chief Justice Gleeson, a person is not in a position of special 
disadvantage, be it constitutional, situational or otherwise, simply because of 
an inequality of bargaining power.  Unconscientious exploitation of another’s 
inability, or diminished ability, to conserve their interests is not to be confused 
with taking advantage of a superior bargaining position. 
 
Chief Justice Gleeson opined that there was neither a special disadvantage 
on the part of the tenant, nor unconscientious conduct by the landlord.  The 
tenant’s disadvantage was that they had no legal entitlement to a renewal or 
extension of their lease but this was not a special disadvantage sufficient to 
entitle the tenant to relief.  The tenant had a choice between pursuing their 
litigation claim or selling their business.  The tenant made a rational decision 
and chose to prefer the second financial interest. 
 
Gummow and Hayne JJ 
 
In a joint judgment, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted that the special 
disadvantage requisite to found relief was one that seriously affected the 
ability of the innocent party to make a judgment as to that party’s own best 
interests.  Despite their inferior bargaining position, the tenant did not lack 
capacity to make this judgment. 
 
Callinan J 
 
The ACCC sought to characterise the decision of the primary judge (French J) 
as an exercise of discretion, and accordingly not open to interference except 
upon narrow grounds.  This submission was rejected as not being supported 
by either the language of s51AA or the concept of unconscionability under the 
unwritten law.  Justice Callinan considered that the evaluation of the facts by 
the Full Court was to be preferred to that of the primary judge. 
 
In Callinan J’s view, the Full Court did not err in taking the view that the only 
matters which the evidence established as giving rise to any alleged ‘special 
disadvantage’ were those common to any tenant who found themselves 
without a right to a further lease term.  On this basis the Full Court correctly 
held that there is nothing special about a situation in which a tenant, without 
an option, is anxious to obtain a fresh lease, and the landlord, conscious of 
that anxiety, utilises it to obtain a business advantage.  For the landlord to 
require the discontinuance of the litigation as part of the price of the grant of a 
new lease that they were not obliged to grant was a ‘not unreasonable quid 
pro quo.’ 
 
Mirroring the views of his fellow majority judges, Callinan J observed: 
 
“There was no circumstance seriously affecting the ability of Mr and Mrs 
Roberts to make a judgment as to where their best interests lay.  They 
recognised and understood what was in their best interests, and acted 
accordingly by undertaking to withdraw from the proceedings in the tribunal 
and by taking up the opportunity of obtaining a fresh lease.”  (at 199) 
 
Kirby J (dissenting) 
 
Justice Kirby advanced a number of reasons for restoring the trial judge’s 
decision.  The factual conclusion that the tenant was suffering from a special 
disadvantage was open on the basis of evidence accepted by the trial judge.  
Unlike the majority, Kirby J considered that the condition of the tenant’s 
daughter and the family predicament faced by the tenant was part of the 
circumstances placing the tenant in a serious ‘situational’ disadvantage and a 
position of inequality vis-à-vis the landlord.  It was also appropriate and proper 
for the trial judge to have regard to the entire course of negotiations between 
the landlord and tenant.  Having regard to these circumstances, the 
conclusion of the primary judge that the tenant suffered from a ‘special 
disadvantage’ was not one that should be disturbed by an appellate court.  
Rather than being a ‘hard bargain’ (as characterised by the Full Court) this 
was an unconscionable misuse of economic superiority. 
 
In terms of legal principle, Kirby J accepted the primary judge’s approach to 
the construction and application of s51AA.  Justice Kirby viewed the case as 
offering a choice between affording s51AA what he described as a broad and 
beneficial application as opposed to a narrow and restrictive one.  The 
following observation is made: 
 
“Cases of this kind depend (as the primary judge and others who have dealt 
with like problems have pointed out) upon their own facts and circumstances 
judged against a criterion that is easier to describe than to define.  The 
statutory standard is flexible.  It must be so because of the wide variety of 
circumstances to which s51AA of the Act applies.  Having regard to the 
history and purposes of that provision, and the language of its expression, I 
could not accept the proposition that s51AA has a limited operation.  It is as 
large as the statutory text and the incorporated unwritten law permit.  It has a 
capacity to expand and apply to new circumstances as the unwritten law 
evolves ‘from time to time’.”  (at 185) 
 
Consistent with what Kirby J perceived to be the educative and deterrent 
purposes of s51AA, he could discern no error of legal principle in the 
approach of Justice French. 
 
Common Ground 
 
Notwithstanding the strong dissenting judgment of Kirby J, certain 
propositions emerge clearly from all judgments: 
 
 The disadvantage associated with an inferior bargaining position (often 
suffered by small tenants in their dealings with large landlords) is not a 
special disadvantage per se.  In this context, the use of the qualifying word 
‘special’ before ‘disadvantage’ disavows any suggestion that a mere 
difference in bargaining power will be sufficient to invoke the principle 
(refer to Mason J in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 
151 CLR 447 at 462) 
 
 The striking of a hard bargain, from the perspective of the weaker party, 
does not, in itself, justify the conclusion of unconscionable conduct on the 
part of the stronger party. 
 
 Contrary to a comment made by the Full Federal Court, the question of 
whether the will of a party has been overborne is a consideration relevant 
to the doctrine of common law duress and should not be viewed as a 
prerequisite to a successful unconscionability claim. 
 
Comment  
 
In the course of this litigation the ACCC made a submission that 
unconscionable conduct, for the purposes of s51AA, might arguably fall into 
any one of four categories: 
 
1. The discrete doctrine of unconscionable dealing resulting from the 
knowing exploitation by one party of the special disadvantage of another. 
 
2. All specific equitable doctrines, including estoppel, unilateral mistake, relief 
against forfeiture and undue influence, which are united by the underlying 
notion of ‘unconscionability’ 
 
3. The doctrine of unjust enrichment in addition to all the specific equitable 
doctrines referred to in 2. 
 
4. Any conduct which is contrary to ‘conscience’ in its ordinary meaning. 
 
As mentioned, to determine this case the High Court only ultimately needed to 
examine issues arising from suggested category 1.  It was not considered 
necessary to canvas the correctness, or otherwise, of the ACCC’s attempted 
categorisation. 
 
It was unfortunate that this appeal did not provide the occasion for a complete 
exposition of the meaning and operation of s51AA or the current law of 
unconscionability.  The undoubted need for such an exposition by the High 
Court is epitomised by the dichotomy of views that have been expressed by 
various Federal court judges.  In this regard, and by way of example only, the 
views of the trial judge, French J, may be contrasted with the views expressed 
by Gyles J in GPG (Australia Trading) Pty Ltd v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd 
(2001) 117 FCR 23, at 77 (the differing emphases being merely noted in the 
joint judgment of Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
 
Whilst providing valuable guidance as to the operation of s51AA in a particular 
context, the High Court has not considered it appropriate to provide any 
indication of the full ambit of the section.  It is to be hoped that a full and clear 
elaboration of the scope of s51AA will soon be forthcoming. 
